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Corporatism is observed to exert a moderating influence on the
wage gap, the difference between the actual wage rate and the full
employment wage rate. Corporatist countries therefore show a lesser de-
gree of unemployment. This paper explores and models one of the reasons
why these results might be observed. An important reason for wage
moderation is the endogeneity of the wage tax rate for a centralized or
encompassing trade uníon. Centralized trade unions, which are an essen-
tial feature of corporatist countries, will realize that a higher gross
wage level generally implies higher government expenditures and there-
fore a higher wage tax rate, which reduces the gains of increasing the
gross wage rate. This will moderate their wage claims. Trade unions in a
decentralized setting on the other hand will neglect the government
budget constraint because the effect of their behaviour on net govern-
ment expenditures is very small for every single trade union.
It is shown that both gross and net wages and the unemployment
rate are higher in case of decentralized wage setting, whereas the level
of economic activity is lower.-3-
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1. Introduction
.
The institutional organization of a country can make quite a dif-
ference for the way its economy performs. The growing attention paid to
trade unions in the literature (e.g. Calmfors 1985; McDonald and Solow
1981; Oswald 1985; van der Ploeg 1986; Sampson 1983) ís like writing on
the wall. Recently a number of writers (Bean, Layard and Nickell 1986;
Bruno and Sachs 1985; McCallum 1983; Newell and Symons 1987) have
focussed especially on the effect of corporatism on macro economic
performance.
Bruno and Sachs found that corporatism exerts a moderating effect
on the wage gap; the difference between the actual and the full
employment wage level. In their index of corporatism, they use several
structiiral characteristics as indicators of corporatism. These are:
whether negotiations take place at a national or local level; the power
of national vis a vis local labour organizations; the extent of employer
coordination; and the power of local shop stewards. Examples of
countries with a very centralízed form of wage setting and trade union
organization or, in the terminology of Bruno and Sachs, with a high de-
gree of corporatism are Austria, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands. At
the other extreme countries can be found, where not much power is vested
in the trade union federation, and the constituent or local trade unions
have the dominant say in the decentralized wage setting process, with
England as the prime example (see Table 1).
w The author would like to thank Jeffrey Sachs, Rick van der Ploeg,
David Webb and participants at the Econometric Society European
Meeting 1987 in Copenhagen for valuable comments on a previous draft
of the paper. The author is responsible for the contents of the paper.-2-
Table 1. Corporatism the wage gap and unemplovment
Country Corporatism Wage gap Unemployment
index ~ -~~ rate
Austria 4.0 2.3 1.9
Germany 4.0 -0.4 3.5
Netherlands 4.0 0.4 5-3
Norway 4.0 2.5 1,9
Sweden 4.0 -3.6 1.9
Denmark 3.0 3.6 6.5
Switzerland 2.0 2.5 0.4
Finland 1,5 0,1 5.1
Japan 1.5 8.2 2.0
Belgium 0.5 8.9 7.0
Italy 0.5 5.0 6.8
New Zealand 0.5 1.0
Australia 0.0 8.8 5.5
canada o.0 3.4 7.5
France 0.0 5,~ 4,9
United Kingdom 0.0 2.6 5,8
United States 0.0 -2 1 6 9
Source: Bruno and Sachs (1985). The original source of the wage
gap and unemplovment data is the OECD.
Bruno and Sachs have tried to explain the inverse relationship be-
tween corporatism and the wage rate they observed. Bruno and Sachs
suggest that corporatism may be effective in overcomíng informational
inefficiencies (Grossman and Hart 1981, Brunner, Cukierman and Meltzer
1980), that it might forestall interunion rivalries (Lange, Ross and
Vannicelli 1982) and that the greater role in economic policy making un-
der corporatism may have been bought with a wage moderating attitude by
the trade unions.-3-
Some other papers on the role of trade unions in wage setting
(Hart 1982; Jackman 1985; Abraham 1988) are relevant for the explanation
of the relation between corporatism and the wage level as well. Jackman
(1985) shows among other things that decentralized trade unions are in-
efficient because each tries to increase its real wage rate by raising
the nominal wage rate, but instead of succeeding in this purpose, the
trade unions cause inflation and thereby diminish real aggregate demand
and overall employment. This result crucially depends on the assumption
of a constant returns to scale production technology, a constant mark-up
of prices over wages and a nominally fixed aggregate demand. If on the
other hand aggregate demand would be fixed in real terms or if the ag-
gregate supply curve would slope vertically, this inefficiency result
would disappear. Abraham (1988) concentrates on the existence of an ag-
gregate demand externality as well, to prove the inefficiency of
decentralized wage setting. His externality comes about if a high wage
rate in one industry reduces the demand for the product and thereby the
demand for labour in another industry. A national union takes this ex-
ternality into account and settles for a lower wage rate than the local
or decentralized trade unions. From Hart's paper (1982) it is clear that
when trade unions are monopolistic competitors who compete to get their
fixed memberships employed with the same group of firms, the wage rate
is an inverse function of the number of unions; the smaller the number
of unions the greater their mon~poly power and the higher their wage
demands. So Hart's paper seems to point at the advantages of decentral-
ized wage setting and interunion rivalries, contrary to what Bruno and
Sachs (1985) and Lange, Ross and Vannicelli (1982) argue. It should be
noted however that Hart's unions have quite definite reasons for merging
and there is generally not a body like the Monopolistic Trade Commission
to keep them from merging or cooperating.
This paper explores another reason for the observed wage moderat-
ing effect of corporatism. This argument focusses on an essential
feature of corporatism, the degree of centralization in wage setting. Zt
seeks the explanation of wage moderation under corporatism in the dif-
ferent way decentralized trade unions and centralized trade unions
regard the tax rate. Trade unions in a decentralized setting can neglect
the effects of their behaviour on tax rates and benefit levels. because-4-
the effect of their behaviour on the average wage level is very small
for every single trade union. Therefore they need not take account of
the government budget constraint. The effect on the average wage level
is not negligible however in case an all encompassing or centralized
trade union or a trade union federation is involved in centralized wage
setting. Such a trade union (federation), which is referred to in this
paper as a centralized trade union, realizes that the average wage level
influences government expenditures (through benefit pay for the un-
employed and the payroll for the public sector employees) and tax income
and this in turn will influence the tax rate on wage income (or equiv-
alently the rates of social security contributions). To determine the
effect of its behaviour on the net wage rate, an optimizing centralized
trade union which cares about the net wage rate, will therefore have to
take the public sector budget constraint into account and the effects of
its wage setting behaviour through the budget constraint on the wage tax
rate and thereby on the net wage rate.
The consequences for the macro economic performance, the wage
rate, the unemployment rate and the levels of employment and economic
activity of the differences between situations of centralized and
decentralized wage setting are examined in this paper. For that purpose
two models of nation wide wage setting are set up. In the first model
the wage rate for every firm in the economy is determined by a firm
specific trade union which is referred to as a decentralized trade union
and which does not cooperate with other trade unions. In the second
model an economy wide centralized trade union sets the wage rate for all
firms. Profit maximising firms determine in both models the levels of
employment in their firms, whereas the government sets the wage tax rate
in such a way that its budget constraint is satisfied.
The setup of the second model follows the Scandinavian tradition,
in assuming an encompassing or centralized trade union which dominates
the wage setting (e.g. Calmfors 1982; Calmfors and Horn 1985, 1986;
Hersoug 1985). The methodology for the decentralized wage setting model
is the same in the sense that the decentralized trade unions also
dominate the wage setting in the negotiations with the firms and aim at
the same goals. This ís done in order to stress the key distinction be-
tween the models; the different attitude towards the government budget-5-
constraint and the ensuing tax rate by decentralized and centralized
trade unions.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the decentralized
wage setting is set up. The consequences of the public sector budget
constraint for the behaviour of every individual trade union are out-
lined and the effects of changing exogenous variables such as the level
of benefits, are presented. In section 3 the centralized wage setting is
elaborated and the outcome is compared to the results of the decentral-
ized wage setting situation. Section 4 concludes the paper.-6-
2.-Decentr~lize~ wage setting
Consider an economy which consists of I identical firms and an
equal number of identical firm specific trade unions. Every firm, and
the trade union it deals with, is identified by a real number i. Firm i
maximises its profits, Ri, subject to a given gross real wage rate, wi,




Ri - f(~i) - wi~i. Yi- f(~i). f1~0. f11~0 (2.1)
where yi is the firms output and f(~i) its production function, which
shows diminishing marginal returns in the production factor labour, ~i,
and which satisfies the Inada conditions. The firms wage costs are
linear in labour input and gross wages.
Maximisation of firm i's profits with respect to its labour input
leads to the following labour demand curve,
~i - Li(wi). Li(wi) ~ 0 (2.2)
The wage rate for the employees of firm i is determined by the firm
specific trade union i. In achieving its goals, trade union i is
restricted by firm i's labour demand function, equation (2.2). Trade
union i is therefore a so called monopoly trade union (McDonald and
So1ow 1981).
Trade union i cares about the wage income and the level of employ-
ment of its membership. Such preferences sllow for various specific
possibilities regarding its utility function. The trade union might be
supposed to maximise the wage bill w~ (Dunlop 1944), total rent, that is
the surplus of income over the wage bill under perfect competition (De
Menil 19~~), or a more general Stone-Geary utility function that allows
for subsistence levels of wages and employment and the importance of su-
pernumerary wages and employment (Pencavel 1984).
Here it is assumed that the trade union maximises a utilitarian
utility function with respect to the gross wage rate (McDonald and Solow
1981; oswald 1982a, 1985; van der Ploeg 1986),-7-
(1-t)w ) b, u')0, u " (0 (2.3)
where UD denotes the level of utility achieved by trade union i, ni
denotes the size of its membership or reference group which is assumed
to be larger than the number of employed .ii, b the level of real un-
employment benefits and t the labour tax rate, which can be taken to
comprise wage taxes, employers and employees social security contribu-
tions and the like (see Layard and Nickell 1986). The advantage of this
specification is that it has a micro economic foundation and can be
derived from aggregating the preferences of two groups of employed and
unemployed workers with risk averse (u " ~0) or riskneutral (u "-0)
preferences.
Trade union i is aware of the fact that restrictions exist not
only on the firms behaviour, but on the governments behaviour as well,
because of the public sector budget constraint. The government maintains
a balanced budget by manipulating the wage tax rate. The wage tax rate
is set according to the following rewritten budget constraint,
,
where,
Max UD - ,liu((1-t)wi) ; (ni-,ii)u(b).
w.
i
t - T(w,g,b,m) - w~ t(m-ti-g)b } gw} )0 (2.4)
I I
~ - ~ ~i, w - ~ .~iwi and ,L - ILi(w) - L(w)
i i~-
Hence .~ is aggregrate private sector employment and w is the average
private sector wage rate. m denotes total fixed labour supply and g
public sector employment including people on employment programs. The
wage tax rate is equal to the government expenditures on the unemployed
and on the public sector labour force, divided by the wage sum. Note
that the unemployed (m-.~-g) are granted real benefits b, while the
public sector employed get the same pay as the average worker in the
private sector.-8-
The tax rate depends amongst other things on the average private
sector wage level w, the level of benefits b, the number of public sec-
tor employees g, and the size of the labour force m. Assumíng identical
firms, the derivatives of the tax rate can be calculated as,
Tw - w(1 g){g - L~(w)(bttw) - t(,Z. ,t g)}.
- ~-~-g) m-~- Tw)0 iff e~}g C
b(m- -g) . gyv t b( .g) C-~Z (z.5)
m-,~-g Tb - w(14g) ~0
1 {(1-t)w - b} ~0 Tg - w~




Three different forces influence the tax rate when the average wage
level changes. First of all tax revenues from existing private and
public sector employees, (.Ltg), rise, secondly tax revenues are reduced
and expenditure on social security increased because some people become
unemployed and no longer pay taxes but instead claim benefits,
(L'(w)(bttw)), and thirdly government expenditures go up because of a
higher wage bill for the public sector employees, g. It is most likely
that the latter two effects dominate and that an increase in the gross
wage rate will lead to an increase in the wage tax rate (T )0). Only if
w
the elasticity of the demand for labour in absolute terms is very small
indeed, will T be negative. A sufficient condition for a positive T is w w
that the labour demand elasticity in absolute terms is larger than the
rate of unemployment. In allmost all countries Tw will be positive if
the demand for labour elasticity is larger than 0.20 in absolute terms.
Given the empirical evidence on the labour demand elasticity (see e.g.
Symons and Layard ~983), it seems natural to take Tw as positive without
1 much reservations. The sign of Tw is by the way rather crucial for the
relation between the outcomes of centralized and decentralized wage set-
ting as will become clear in section 3.-9-
The wage tax rate will go up as well if the level of benefits
is increased ( Tb)0), as might be expected. Higher benefits imply in-
creased social security expenditure and require therefore a higher wage
tax rate if the budget deficit is to remain unchanged. The same applies
for a rise in public sector employment. This too will lead to a increase
in the tax rate ( Tg)0), but this increase is small if net unemployment
benefits are high relative to net wages. In that case it does not make
much difference in terms of costs to the public sector whether some is
unemployed or is employed in the public sector. A rise in the labour
supply increases expenditures on social security and will therefore make
the tax rate go up (T ~0). m
Every trade union i is aware of the public sector budget con-
straint and the consequences this ~onstraint implies for the height of
the wage tax rate, but this knowledge does not imply that it will affect
their behaviour. The effect of the wage rate set by one trade union on
the average wage rate, will be small if the size of trade union i is not
very large, and the effect of a change in its wage rate on the wage tax
rate for the economy might therefore be neglected (Tw.áW --0). The for
i
trade union i's behaviour important derivative of the net wage rate with
respect to the gross wage rate, simplifies then from:
d(1-t)wi
dw d(1-t)wi
dw - 1- t-
wTw.dw to dw - 1-t. It will be assumed that
i i i
all trade unions in the decentralized setting neglect the effect of
their behaviour on the wage tax rate and thereby on the net wage sum of
its membership or its reference group. This simplification (taking dW
dw.
i
as zero instead of very small) does not make a difference for the nature
of the result obtained, nor will it make much of a difference in the
size of the effect unless decentralized wage setting comprises say just
two or three unions.
Trade union i 's goal is therefore to maximise its utility function
(2.3) subject to the constraint of the labour demand curve (2.2) under
d(1-t)w
the assumption that dw i- 1-t. Solving this problem yields?
i
UDw. - Li(wi)~u((1-t}wi) - u(b)~
i-10-
t (1-t)~iu'((1-t)wi) - 0 (2.9)
where UD is the derivative of trade union i's utility with respect to iw.
i
its wage rate.
Equation (2.9) expresses that the trade union federation equates
the utility loss [u((1-t)wi) - u(b)] for the workers who become
unemployed, Li(w), as a result of a marginal rise in the wage rate, to
the marginal gain in utility (1-t)u'((1-t)wi) for the employed, .i, of
such a marginal rise in the wage rate. In other words, the union sets as
a typical monopolist a markup of u((1-t)wi) over u(b) that is an inverse
function of the elasticity of demend for labour e~ that the trade union
faces. Equation (2.9) implies therefore that the wage rate is set
higher, the higher the marginal utility which is associated with an in-
crease in wage income and the less elastic labour demand is with respect
to changes in the wage rate.
Since all decentralized trade unions deal with similar firms and
since their memberships are of similar size, they will set the same wage
rate and hence a symetric equilibrium results. Because of this, the
demand for labour elasticity for one firm is the same as the demand for
labour elasticity of the I firms taken together3 Equation (2.9) can
therefore be written as,
UW - L'(w)[u((1-t)w) - u(b)] t(1-t).~u'((1-t)w) - 0,
wi - w. ~ - L(w) - ILi(wi) (2.10)
The solution to the decentralized trade unions problem can
easily be depicted graphically for the situation where the number of
public sector employed is zero (g-0). Note that the labour demsnd curve
can be conceived in terms of the gross wage rate as well as in terms of
the net wage rate (~i-Li((1-t)wi,b,g)). Since g-0, the tax rate is zero
at the full employment wage rate, and st that point the labour demand
curves in terms of gross and net wage rates coincide. For every other
(positive) tax rate, the labour demand curve in terms of the net wage
L~ate lies below the labour demand curve in terms of the gross wage rate.-11-
Each trade union chooses the gross wage rate where its indif-
ference curve is tangent to its labour demand curve in terms of the net
wage rate at the given tax rate (see figure 1). If the trade unions are
risk neutral, they maximise the shaded area, the surplus of the net wage
sum over the sum of the benefits the employed would receive in case of
unemployment. If the trade unions are risk averse, they will attach





Figure 1. The solution to the decentralized trade unions problem
The gross wage rate can be solved from equation (2.10), as a
function of the level of benefits and the tax rate,
w - QDCb.t~ (2.11)
The effects of changes in the tax rate respectively the level of
benefits on the gross wage rate can be determined by applying the im-
plicit function theorem to equation (2.10),
D
D dw - -Uwj.
Qj - dj - D , jE{b,t}
Uww
(2.12)
which is by the way equivalent to the application of this theorem to
equation (2.9). These effects are,-12-
QD - ~{(e~tl)u'((1-t)w) t (1-t)wu"((1-t)w)}~U~,
QD)0 iff e (-1 - ~1-t)wu"((1-t)w)
t ~ u'((1-t)w)
and,
Qb - L'(w)u'(b)~U~) 0
Í2.13)
(2.14)
An increase in the wage tax rate will make the unions increase the
gross wage rate if (sufficient condition) the demand for labour elas-
ticity which the unions face is larger than unity in absolute terms. Zf
the trade unions are very risk averse, u"((1-t)w)~u'((1-t)w) is negative
and large in absolute terms), this condition is substantially relaxed.
The effect of an increase in the level of benefits on the gross
wage rate is unambiguously positive (Qb)U). An increased level of
benefits reduces the opportunity costs for the trade unions of increas-
ing the wage rate; the unemployed resulting from a rise in the gross
wage rate get better paid. The decentralized trade unions behaviour is
not affected by a change in the size of the the labour force (m) or by a
change in the number of public sector employees, because it does not af-
fect their utility.
These results are well known for the one union one firm case (e.g.
Calmfors 1982; McDonald and Solow 1981; Oswald 1982; Van der Ploeg 1986)
but they do not take account of the effect of the government budget con-
straint c.q. her tax setting policy. For every tax rate there exists an
optimal gross wage rate for the trade unions (see figure 2), but there
exists just one tax rate, that satisfies the government budget con-




Figure 2. The solution to the decentralized trade unions problem
It follows from the government budget constraint, equation (2.4),
that the tax rate changes as a result of a change in the level of
benefits, the size of the labour force, the number of public sector
employees and the average private sector wage level. The reduced form
equation for the wage rate is,
w - QD~b,T(w.b.g.m)] - WD~B.b.m] (2.15)
which derivatives can be calculated by applying the implicit function
theorem to equation (2.10) with the labour demand and the tax rate sub-
stituted out using the aggregate version of the labour demand equation
(2.2) respectively the governments tax rule, equation (2.4), as,
Wb - 1-TWQD
{TbQD t Qb},
Wb)0 if -1 t e~ ~ - ~~







WD - 1 T QD
m 1-TwQD m t (2.19)
Taking account of the budget constraint makes the effect of a change in
the level of benefits on the gross wage rate ambiguous. The sign is
likely to be positive however. This will be the case if an equilibrium
exists and if' the labour demand elasticity in absolute terms is larger
than the unemployment rate4 The ambiguity arises because a rise in the
level of benefits not just induces the trade unions to raise their wage
demands c.p, the tax rate ( Qb~O), but also drives up the tax rate
(Tb~O). This increased tax rate might in turn cause the trade unions to
moderate their wage demands to the extent that they may fall on balance.
This however will only be the case if a small rise in the tax rate makes
the trade unions cut their wage demands amply, ( QD is negative and
large)5
The effects of a change in the number of public sector employees
g, and in labour supply m, (Wg resp. Wm), on the gross wage rate, depend
on the sign of QD, which in turn depends on the size of the demand for
labour elasticity and the degree of risk aversity of the trade union.
This dependence of Wg and Wm on the sign of QD is not surprising because
the number of public sector employees, g, and the size of the labour
supply, m, exert their effect on the wage setting behaviour of the trade
unions solely through the tax rate (see equations (2.10) and (2.11)).
Once the effects on the gross wage rate are established it is easy
to derive the effects of changes in the level of benefits, the number of
public sector employees and the size of the labour force on the rate of
unemployment and the levels of employment and economic activity. They
can be derived from the aggregate version of the labour demand curve (L
w
(0), the production function (dy~d.t~0) and the definition of the un-
employment rate ((m-~-g)~m). So the effects on the levels of employment
and economic activity are opposite to the effects on the gross wage
rate.
Having determined the behaviour of decentralized trade unions in
this section and the way the wage rate reacts to changes in the ex-
ogenous variables both ceteris paribus the tax rate and with the tax-15-
rate determined by the governments budget constraint, attention is now
turned to centralized wage setting.-16-
3. Centralized wage setting
Consider an all encompassing private sector trade union or trade
union federation, referred to as a centralized trade union, which faces
the same economy as the decentralized trade unions described in the pre-
vious section. The centralized trade union guards furthermore the same
interests as the independent trade unions in the decentralized wage set-
ting situation and negotiates seperately with all the firms. Note that
this is an innocuous assumption because the centralized trade union can
not wield more power than the decentralized trade unions in dealing with
the various firms.
The basic difference in behaviour between the centralized trade
union and the I firm specific trade unions is that the centralized trade
union will not neglect the tax rule or budget constraint of the
government.
The centralized trade union maximises a utilitarian utility func-
tion that is equivalent to the sum of the utilitarian utility functions
of the I small trade unions in the decentralized wage setting situation,
max UC - ,~u((1-t)w) t (m-.í-g)u(b),
w
~ - ILí(w) - L( w). n - I
i
(3.1)
The reference group of the centralized trade union includes all the mem-
bers of the reference groups of the trade unions in the decentralized
case. The labour demand function the centralized trade union faces, is
the sum of all the labour demand curves the decentralized trade unions
faced.
The unions problem can be solved by maximising the centralized
trade unions utility functíon (3.1) subject to the aggregate version of
the labour demand function, equation (3.2) and the government budget
constraint equation (2.4)6 for,
UW - L'(w)[u((1-t)w) - u(b)] t~(1-t-wTw)u'((1-t)w) - 0(3.2)
which in turn can be solved for the wage rate,-17-
w - W~Cb.B.m] (3.3)
where t and T are defined according to equations (2.4) and (2.5) w
respectively and (1-t-wTw) is positive in the relevant area because
otherwise the centralized trade union could obtain a higher net wage
rate and a higher level of employment at the same time. Equation (3.2)
expresses basically the same wage setting behaviour as that described by
equation (2.10). The centralized trade union makes the utility loss,
[u((1-t)w) - u(b)], for the workers who become unemployed, L'(w), as a
result of a marginal rise in the wage rate equal to the marginal gain in
utility, u'((1-t)w), for the employed workers, ~, of a rise in the wage
rate.
The basic difference between the condition for an optimum for
centralized wage setting (equation (3.2)) and this condition for
decentralized wage setting (equation (2.10)) is the term wT on the w
right hand side of equation (3.2). This term wTw, the effect of a change
in the (average) wage rate on the wage tsx rate multiplied by the wage
rate, shows up in equation (3.2), because the trade union federation
takes into account the effect on the wage tax rate and thereby the net
wage rate it produces by changing the gross wage rate.
The solution to the centralized trade unions problem can easily be
depicted graphically (see figure 3) for the situation where the number
of public sector employed is zero (g-0). The aggregate labour demand
curve can be conceived in terms of the gross wage rate as well as in
terms of the net wage rate (.~-Ln((1-T(w.b,g,m))w,b,g)) with an en-
dogenous tax rate. The slope of the labour demand curve in terms of the
net wage rate is positive, but less steep than the slope of the labour
demand curve in terms of the gross wage rate if the net wage rate in-
creases with the gross wage rate, but leas than the gross wage rate (1 ~
1-t-wTw ) O). The centralized trade union chooses the gross wage rate
where its indifference curve is tangent to the labour demand curve in
terms of the net wage rate at the endogenous tax rate which satisfies







Figure 3. The solution to the centralized trade unions problem
The effect of a change in the level of benefits on the gross wage
rate under centralized bargaining, can be determined by applying the im-
plicit function theorem to equation (2.3) and the government budget
constraint, equation (2.4), as,
C C m-,~-
WC - - Uwb } TbUwt - ,i{~}[1-t-wTw]u"((1-t)w)
C C
b Uww 4 TwUwt Uww } TwUwt
dUC-O
t
L'(w)Cu'(b)-Zu'((1-t)w)1 Z - g - .ltg ,Ctg ~1
c c . -
U~ t TWUwt
(3.5)
If the second order condition for an optimum is fulfilled,
C C
(Uww t TWUwt ~0), then the effect of a rise in the level of benefits on
the gross wage rate is positive. Note that such a definite result could
not be obtained for the decentralized wage setting situation ( see equa-
tion 2.16). Similarly the effects of a change in the number of public
sector employees g, and in labour supply m, (Wg resp. Wm), on the gross
wage rate, are positive.-19-
c
WC - - TgUwt ~0
g Uww ; TwUwt
C
WC - - mUwt
~0
m Uww ; TwOwt
where,
UWt -( g- Z)e~u'((1-t)w) t w~(1-t-wTw)u"((1-t)w) )0
(3.6)
(3.7)
Now the interesting question is, how do the wage level, the rate
of unemployment and the levels of employment and economic activity under
decentralized wage setting compare with their counterparts under
centralized wage setting for similar levels of benefits and labour
supply? This question is sought to be answered in the rest of this
section.
Denote with the letter D, the solution to the decentralized wage
setting problem as defined by equations (2.1) -(2.3) and (2.9) -
(2.10), and denote with the letter C the solution to the centralized
wage setting problem as defined by equations (3.1) -(3.3).
Definition: X - L'(w)[u((1-t)w) - u(b)]
t .~(1-t-wTw)u'((1-t)w) t Y - 0
1 {b(m-.~-B) .gw} - 0 Z - t -
w~
Proposition 1: wC ( wD if TD)0 d wEW{wD, ..,wC}, bC-bD, m-mD
w
(UC tTCUC CO) and gC-gD
ww w wt
Proof Proposition 1: It follows that Y- 0 in C and Y~ 0 in D since
~DWD,I,Du'((1-tD)wD) ( 0. If a positive impulse of w ~
size Y--~DwD wu'((1-tD)wD), is given to the sys-
tem consisting of the equations X and Z, evaluated
at wD, the wage rate changes from wD to wC. From
the implicit function theorem follows that-zo-
C D ~DwDTw]u"((1-t)w) C C w- w --
UC ~ T UC
~0 if Uww t TwUwt ~0,
ww w wt
Q.E.D.
What makes this proposition interesting is ofcourse that the if
conditions are very likely to hold. First U~ . TWUWt ~0 in wC is a con-
dition for the existence of a maximum for the unions optimization
problem (see equations 2.9 and 2.10). The proposition requires just mar-
ginally sCronger conditions, namely thaC U~ ;DTWUWt is negative not
only in w, but also in the area between w and w and secondly a posi-
tive Tw, which, as is argued in section 2, is most likely the case.
The size of wage difference between the situations of centralized
and decentralized wage setting, depends among other things on the signs
of Tw and Uwt. If both these terms are positive and a higher wage rate
therefore leads to a higher tax rate, and a higher tax rate to a higher
wage rate, then the nominator U~ t TWUWt is likely to be small (since
UWw is negative) and the size of the wage difference therefore large.
This will especially be the case if Tw is large, because that affects
the denominator as well. A large TW is among other things caused by a
high demand for labour elasticity.
From proposition 1 it follows suite that the level of employment
is higher under centralized wage setting since the demand for labour
curve is downward sloping in the wage rate (L'(w)~0). From this it fol-
lows that the rata of unemployment is smaller while the level of
economic activity is higher under centralized wage setting because out-
put increases with labour input (dy~d~~0).
Generally the net wage rate will be higher in the decentralized
wage setting situation. This need not be the case however. If 1-t-wT is w
negative in this situation and the labour demand curve in terms of the
net wage rate and with an endogenous tax rate slopes downward, it is
possible that the net wage rate in the decentralized wage setting situa-
tion lies below the wage rate of the centralized wage setting situation




Figure 4. A smaller net wage rate in decentralized wage setting
The centralized wage setting situation is Pareto superior; all
decentralized trade unions would benefit if the wage rate from the
centralized wage setting situation would prevail. This results from the
assumption that the centralized trade unions utility function consists
of the sum of the decentralized trade unions utility functions, while
the centralized trade union is in the position to internalize the exter-
nality that comes about through the tax setting policy of the
government.
The question can therefore be raised, why the decentralized trade
unions do not merge. One reason could be that in order to facilitate
centralized bargaining some of the trade unions would have to give up
other advantages that outweigh the benefits of internalizing the exter-
nal effect, such as the exploitation of a relatively inelastic labour
demand curve or the exploitation of the trade off between employment and
wages, which might be easier to arrange if bargaining takes place at the
firm or plant level. Another reason could be that it might be very hard
for decentralized trade unions to cooperate in a cheating proof way due
to communication problems (note that small and homogeneous countries are
more likely to score higher on Bruno and Sachs's corporatism index).
An argument in favour of corporatism, which is not puraued here,
is the possibility for a centralized trade union to exploit the trade
off between its goals and the governments goals (see Mulder 1988).
Combining these arguments with the arguments put forward in Harts (1982)-22-
and Abrahams (1987) paper, one obtains the global notion that there ex-
ists a U-shaped relation between the level of the wage rate and the
level of wage setting (see figure 5), instead of a linear relation (see
table 1). More likely however the relationship is multi dimensional with
a role for the factors influencing the level of bargaining, such as com-
munication problems, legal arrangements and exogenous historic events
(for example war) as well.
w
local national(centralized)
Figure 5. The relation between the wage rate and the level of wage
setting-23-
4. ConcludinR remarks
Bruno and Sachs (1985) noted that "unfortunately little if any
formal theoretical modelling of national-level bargaining has yet been
carried out". This paper sims to fill part of this gap. It models an im-
portant reason for the observed wage moderating effect of centralized
wage setting or corporatism in Bruno and Sachs's terminology in two set
ups for nation wide bargaining; a situation for centralized nation wide
wage setting and a set up for nation wide decentralized wage setting.
It has been shown that under conditions that are quite likely
satisfied, decentralized wage setting results in a higher gross wage
rate, reduced levels of employment and economic activity, an increased
rate of unemployment and sometimes a smaller net wage rate, for the same
levels of benefits, labour supply and government employment. The first
condition for this to be true concerns the positivity of Tw, the effect
of a change in the wage rate on the wage tax rate, which is the case if
the demand for labour elasticity is in absolute terms larger than the
unemployment rate. The second condition requires that the solutions for
the optimization problems exist and hold in a somewhat larger area than
is necessary to ensure a maximum.
The crucial difference between centralized and decentralized wage
setting which leads to this result is the exogeneity of the wage tax
rate in case of wage setting by decentralized trade unions versus the
endogeneity of this variable in case of wage setting by a centralized
trade union. A centralized trade union will realize that a higher gross
wage level will generally imply higher net government expenditures on
social security and the like, and therefore a higher wage tax rate,
which reduces the gsins of increasing the gross wage rate. This will
moderate the wage demands of a centralized trade union. Trade unions in
a decentralized setting on the other hand will neglect the government
budget constraint because the effect of their behaviour on net govern-
ment expenditures is very small for every single trade union.
The central argument put forward in this paper is robust in the
sense that it does not disappear in a steady state situation while the
reasons for the decentralized trade unions not to merge can be suffi-
ciently strong to prevent collusion.-24-
Quantatively the argument put forward in the paper will be impor-
tant in countries with a relatively large number of public sector
employees and a sizable labour demand elasticity.
Footnotes
1. Tw is regarded as positive as well by for example Calmfors and Horn
(1986). They quote evidence from Sweden to substantiate the realism
of this assumption.
If positive other public expenditures are included in the budget con-
straint, the labour elasticity required for a positive Tw becomes
somewhat larger. If on the other hand profit tax revenues which are
negatively related to the wage rate, are included in the government
budget constraint the required labour demand elasticity is smaller.
2. The second order condition for a maximum for the unions problem is
given by:
UWw - L"(w)[u((1-t)w) - u(b)] t 2L'(w)(1-t)u'((1-t)w)
t .t(i-t)2u"((i-t)w) ~o. u~~o if L"(w)~o
A sufficient condition for a maximum is that the second derivative of
the demand for labour function is negative, i.e. that the demand for
labour curve is concave to the origin in the relevant area.
3. If other production factors are included in the production function,
such as capital, the argument will go through as well if output is
homogeneous of degree one in these other factors of production.
4. Positivity of 1-TWQD is a condition for the existence of an
equilibrium, while positivity of TbQ~ . Qb is ensured if the demand
for labour elasticity is larger than the unemployment rate in ab-
solute terms. This latter condition is quite likely to be fulfilled,
especially since it is just a sufficient and not a necessary
condition.-25-
5. This result contrasts with the findings of Kemp, Leonard and Van Long
(198~). They find that a rise in che level of benefits, defenitely
results in a smaller gross wage rate. This surprising outcome is
basically due to the assumption that trade unions just maximise the
net wage rate, without regard of the pay unemployed get or the number
of people that are employed as long as at least half the labour force
is employed. Higher benefits therefore in general only influence the
wage setting behaviour of the trade unions by driving up the tax
rate. The higher tax rate unambiguously reduces the wage claims of
the trade unions because a smaller gross wage rate makes the tax rate
go down and the net wage rate go up. which is in the absence of any
other effect, a sufficient motive even for the small decentralized
trade unions assumed in their set up, to reduce their wage claims.
If the trade unions would just marginally care about the level of
benefits for the unemployed their result would change, because in the
present set-up the motive to reduce the gross wage claim in the face
of a rise in the level of benefíts is very week indeed. Their results
are therefore not quite general.
6. The second order condition for the centralized trade union or trade
union federation optimization problem is,
U~ ~ TWUWt- L"(w)[u((1-t)w) - u(b) t g(bftw)u'((1-t)w)] i
(~fg)(1-t-wTw)2u"((1-t)w) f
[2(1-t-wTw) 4 (2t } Twi wTw)g]L'(w)u'((1-t)w)
C C
U~f TWUwt(0 if L"(w)(0 and e~~gC-2
A twofold sufficient condition for this second order condition to
hold is first a second derivative of the demand for labour with
respect to the gross wage rate L"(w), which is negative, and second
that the elasticity of total labour demand e~}g, which the trade
union federation faces is less than minus half.-26-
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